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Abstract 
 
This study uses the positivist agency theory to examine if serial acquirers with consistently 
negative cumulative abnormal returns over their past acquisitions are more likely to become 
targets themselves. The study is based on the assumption that firms that make repeated value 
reducing acquisitions and depress their stock price are more attractive targets than firms that 
make good returns to their shareholders through acquisitions, and whose share prices increase 
correspondingly. Our findings show that serial acquirers that are considered bad bidders are 
more likely to become targets themselves compared to those that are considered good bidders. 
While this is the case in the United States and Europe, we find limited evidence to show that 
the same disciplinary tool is applicable in other parts of the world.  
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1. Introduction 
The direct consequence of principle-agency cost problem is that managers often engage in 
transactions that are value destroying, depressing the market value of the shares and 
diminishing the wealth of their equity holders, while they entrench their positions by getting to 
rule over a larger empire. The difference created by the gap between the actual (depressed) 
share price and the potential share price eventually becomes an incentive for an external party’s 
intervention, seeing it as a rosy target to acquire, get rid it of its incompetent management and 
run it in a way that maximizes profits for the new shareholders (Chemla, 2005; Grinstein, 
2006)..  
That value destroying acquisitions amounts to poor performance which increases the likelihood 
of the firm becoming a takeover target is well known in the takeover literature. (Mitchell and 
Lehn, 1990; Kini et al, 2004). This paper focuses on determining the extent to which managers 
are disciplined when there is a conflict between the acquisition strategy of management and 
that of shareholders’ interest.   
Our study leans on the positivist agency paradigm, and provides evidence that curbing agent 
opportunism and extremism in a ubiquitous agency relationship helps to align the preferences 
of the agent with those of the principal. The consequences of reckless actions by the agent, 
measured by value diminishing acquisitions, can trigger a takeover bid for the firm. The 
takeover threat therefore becomes both behavioural and outcome oriented which serves to 
reduce bad acquisitions and managerial opportunism (Eisenhardt, 1989).  However, there is 
limited cross-country evidence that takeover as a control and corporate governance mechanism 
can effectively reduce the potential scope for serial acquisitions.  
Empirical studies that use prior acquisition history as a measure of managerial performance 
suggest that value can be created by acquiring firms with poor acquisition programmes. For 
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example, Mitchell and Lehn (1990) and Offenberg (2009) find that firms that destroy 
shareholders value through poor acquisitions are subsequently more likely to become takeover 
targets themselves. The worst acquisitions that are made by firms that are later divested either 
in bust-up takeovers or restructuring programmes to thwart takeovers. Lehn and Zhao (2006) 
show that CEOs who make value-reducing acquisitions are more likely than others to be 
replaced through internal and external control mechanisms, including takeovers. 
The paper extends the approach of Mitchell and Lehn (1990) by incorporating broader sample. 
The current study uses 14,316 acquisitions which occurred across the globe between 2003 and 
2013, these being classified as either hostile or friendly. The period of the study   witnessed the 
most prolific global merger and acquisition activities and therefore provides a better insight on 
the contemporary use of targeted acquisition as a disciplinary tool. Most studies that have 
considered takeover as a disciplinary tool have often focused on individual countries (Mitchell 
and Lehn, 1990; Mikkelson and Partch, 1997; Scharfstein, 1988).  The study combines both 
the behaviour-oriented and outcome-oriented agency theories and their implications in the use 
of takeover as a disciplinary tool across different countries.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section two provides the theoretical framework 
and a review of the literature on disciplinary measures and poor managerial performance. 
Section three describes the data used while section four discusses the development of the model 
and hypotheses. Sections five and six presents the descriptive and empirical results 
respectively, and section seven is the conclusion.  
 
2. Theoretical framework and review of literature 
Our study develops from the positivist agency theory which posits that when there is a conflict 
between the principal and the agent, and it is costly for the principal to observe or verify the 
actions of the agent, then curbing the agent’s opportunism and extremism become inevitable 
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(Eistenhardt, 1989). Mergers or acquisitions provide such tangential and ambivalent 
opportunity through which shareholders can wedge disciplinary measures on the management, 
particularly where past acquisitions have consistently failed or performed below expectations 
(Chemla, 2005; Grinstein, 2006).  
Such disciplinary measures can be expended through behaviour-oriented contracts as well as 
outcome-oriented contracts, which subsist between the directors and shareholders of the firm. 
Although both are reward based, the former involves control over salaries and entitlements 
while the latter is based on commission payments associated with the outcome of transactions. 
The positivism theorist argue that both tools aim to make the managers feel jittery over 
acquisitions that are perceived as too risky for the business, as the consequences may be 
unpleasant (Pleffer, 1981; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The penalty may be a revolution in the 
ownership and management of the firm. The other argument is that reward based contracts tend 
to deter managers from taking inevitable investment risks that may have potential benefits to 
the business. 
Denis and Kruse (2000) outlined three major disciplinary measures which include, corporate 
takeovers, board dismissals, and shareholder activism which are, commonly used against poor 
performing management. Such corporate governance measures do not in themselves reduce 
low performance by management but rather spurs them to create better value for their 
shareholders. The reasoning behind the disciplinary takeover argument is that poor 
performance will prompt bidders to take over firms, which could lead to a loss for the 
stakeholders. Since the stakeholders anticipate this, the threat of a takeover provides them with 
incentives to insist on creative value and invest more funds (Chemla, 2005). This is based on 
the assumption that poor performance is usually associated with low stakeholders’ investment 
which could prompt takeover bids, yielding negative consequences to the stakeholders.   
Though some of the disciplinary techniques against poor performing management have 
remained questionable, their use as tools of discipline is unequivocal. Frank and Mayer (1996) 
note that high board turnover does not derive from past managerial failure and therefore argue 
that hostile takeovers cannot be used as a disciplining measure. Shivdasani (1993) examines a 
sample of takeover bids that are perceived to be disciplinary in nature and asserts that hostile 
takeovers provide discipline when internal governance mechanisms such as the board of 
directors fail to control management’s non-value-maximizing behaviour. The operations and 
nature of corporate governance differ across countries. Therefore, the implications of these 
findings outside the US may not be same. For instance, cultural and legal differences between 
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Europe, Africa and Asia may be key to understanding how board turnover and internal 
governance mechanisms work. 
 
Disciplinary actions can also be in forms of managerial replacement or liquidation of the 
company. Grinstein (2006) and Weisbach (1993) argue that the potential replacement of 
managers through a hostile takeover provides incentives for them to take actions that keep their 
stock price as high as possible. In the US, one of such catalyst of disciplinary takeover is 
through shareholders class action which involves legal actions against managers of companies 
that are accused of poor disclosure, performance and issuing misleading statements to the 
market (Humphrey-Jenner, 2012).  
 
Even among firms that are not taken over, corporate takeover activity can play a role in 
disciplining poor performing managers. Takeover and takeover-related activity assist corporate 
boards in carrying out their charge to oversee and discipline management. Mikkelson and 
Partch (1997) argue that takeover activity facilitates the replacement of managers of poor 
performing firms and argue that corporate managers face less pressure to maximize value when 
takeover activity diminishes. 
 
3. Description of data 
The sample used in this study is drawn from the SDC Platinum mergers and acquisitions 
database over a 10-year period from 2003 through 2013. This was a period of increased 
takeover activities across the globe. Daily data for the market return were collected from 
DataStream for each transaction based on the local index of the acquiring firms i.e. S&P 500 
for US acquirers, FTSE all share index UK acquirers, ISRAEL TA 100 price index for Israeli 
acquirers, etc. Any transactions where data are not available for the local index of the acquiring 
firm were dropped.   
The sample comprises of 2,933 public companies drawn from three main geographical groups 
from around the world, which are: 
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 United States of America (US): comprising all transactions where the bidding firm is 
incorporated in the United States of America. These consist of 1,274 firms (43% of the 
total sample) that made a total of 6,835 transactions (48% of the total transactions made 
by the entire sample) 
 Europe (Eur): comprising of all transactions where the bidding firm is incorporated in 
countries that are in Europe. They comprise 838 companies (29% of the total sample) 
which between them carried out 4,165 M&A transactions (amounting to 29% of the 
total sample). It is noteworthy that of this figure, the UK accounts for 2,586 (62% of 
the European sample transactions) transactions made by 456 corporations (54% of the 
European serial acquirers). This is no surprising as the UK has the most developed stock 
market in Europe 2 , with very high disclosure requirements and protections for 
shareholders (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003).  
 The Rest of the World (ROW): 821 firms (28% of the sample acquirers) from all 
countries aside from those mentioned above fall into this category. Between them, they 
executed 3,316 transactions accounting for 23% of the total sample transactions.  
To be included in the sample, the firms had to satisfy the under-listed criteria: 
a. Be a public corporation listed in a national exchange in its country of origin between 
1st January 2003 and 30th June 2013. 
b. Have carried out at least 3 mergers or acquisitions between the 1st of January, 2003 and 
31st December 2011. 
c. The minimum deal value of the three transactions referred to in (b) above must be one 
million US dollars ($1,000,000) or its equivalent. 
                                                          
2 The London Stock Exchange was founded in 1801 and currently has a market capitalisation of about US$3.433 
trillion (August 22, 2013) making it the largest exchange in Europe and the fourth largest in the world. 
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d. The bidder must own less than 50% of the target before the deal and more than 50% 
after the deal has been completed. 
e. Have complete data in SDC Platinum and DataStream as summarised in Table 1. 
 
The targets in the sample include public firms, private firms, subsidiaries or divisions in a 
corporation.  Additionally,    
- All transactions in the sample were completed deals which meant the exclusion of 
pending and withdrawn transactions.  
-  Minority stake purchases, share repurchases, leveraged buyouts, management buy-outs 
and exchange offers are controlled for in the sample.  
- The acquiring firm is required to own less than 50% of the target before the deal and 
more than 50% after the deal is concluded.  
- The sample also excludes all firms in the highly regulated financial services industries 
for both acquirers and targets.  
8 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics of acquisitions 2003 -2013 
The table provides descriptive statistics of total sample used in the study. It also shows the total acquisitions, size of firms across US, Europe and the 
rest of the world. 
Category Number 
of firms 
Number of 
acquisitions 
Average 
size of 
firms 
Average 
size of 
targets 
Average size 
of 
acquisitions 
Median size 
of 
acquisitions 
Form of financing 
All cash All stock 
Cash & 
stock Others 
Total 
sample 
2933 14316 4506 1560 0.35 0.04 6395 974 2034 4912 
US 1274 6835 5779 2241 0.39 0.04 3111 354 920 2331 
EUR 838 4165 3406 1678 0.49 0.05 1952 122 553 1588 
 ROW 821 3316 3654 383 0.10 0.05 1332 498 561 993 
 
SOURCE:  Own calculations based on data from SDC Platinum  
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The samples are further classified into three main groups, as shown in Table 2, on the basis of 
whether the firm was a takeover target during the period January 2003 to June 2013: 
 Non-targets: these companies had not received friendly or hostile bids and had neither 
paid greenmail nor were subjected to large unsolicited open-market purchases. This 
group consists of a total of 2,314 firms, representing 78.9% of the total sample size. 
 Hostile Targets: this group consists of 67 firms that were targets of successful or 
unsuccessful hostile tenders and/or large unsolicited open-market purchases in which 
the purchaser had attempted to gain control of the company. 
 Friendly targets: this group consists of 552 firms which were targets of tender offers, 
leveraged buy-outs, mergers etc., whether successful or not.  
 
  Financial data 
As with the rest of the data, all financial data were obtained from DataStream.  Previous studies 
have attempted to understand how the financial structure of a firm affects the probability that 
such a firm would become a target. Franks and Mayer (1996); Franks, Mayer and Renneboo 
(2001) show that less profitable firms are more likely to become targets hence, we include two 
variables – return on equity and leverage - in our model as control variables.  
Others (Baker and Kennedy, 2002), have argued that high levels of leverage would make a firm 
an attractive target as the new owner would benefit a lot from the huge tax shield created by 
the leveraged firm, especially if the acquiring firm itself has a very low leverage level. 
 
  Bidder Quality 
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The quality of each bidder is measured by cumulating abnormal returns (CAR) from all the 
acquisitions made by that firm over the observed period. The CAR which measures the total 
impact of a firm’s acquisition activities on shareholder’s wealth. This makes the total abnormal 
return the primary variable of interest. It indicates if a company has kept to its goal of 
shareholder’s wealth maximization or whether it has gone in the opposite direction and thereby 
reduced the wealth of its shareholders through its acquisition activities.  
The CAR solves some methodological challenges and reduces the risk of bias in the results.  
For instance, using an average would not indicate the total change in shareholders wealth, 
whilst using just one acquisition to judge the quality of a serial acquirer ignores much 
information about the quality of the company’s other acquisitions which are very important.   
Firms that have a negative total abnormal return are often labelled as bad bidders as the total 
impact of their acquisition activities have had a negative effect on shareholder’s wealth. 
Conversely, firms with total abnormal return that is non-negative are classified are good 
bidders as their acquisition activities have either left shareholders the same or have increased 
the total wealth of the shareholders. 
 
  Dummy variable 
A dummy variable (BBD) is included with its value set at 1 if the firm is considered a bad 
bidder and 0 if otherwise.  
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Table 2: Summary statistics of acquisitions based on subsequent standing, 2003 -2013 
The table shows the number of firms by their subsequent ownership standing, the number of acquisitions that were 
carried out during the period, a description of the relative mean and median of the acquisitions made, and the forms of 
payment used in the acquisition 
Category Number 
of firms 
Number of 
acquisitions 
Average size 
of 
acquisitions 
Median size 
of 
acquisitions 
Form of financing 
All 
cash 
All 
stock 
Cash 
& 
stock Others 
Total sample 2933 14316 0.26 0.07 5542 4077 4833 2889 
Non-Targets 2314 11291 0.27 0.07 4672 2075 3031 1513 
Hostile Targets 67 312 0.21 0.09 86 73 76 77 
Friendly Targets 552 2713 0.18 0.09 349 928 825 611 
                        SOURCE: Own calculations based on data from SDC Platinum 
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  Abnormal Returns 
The quality of each individual acquisitions attempt is measured by a cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR). Using the market model, the abnormal returns are estimated in a window of -
2/+2 as: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 
Where: 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal return for company i 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the observed stock return in day t 
?̂?𝑖𝑡is the estimated normal return in day t 
𝑡 is the day relative to the event day 0 
?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 denotes the normal return of the company due to te market-wide 
movement.  
To ensure that the results obtained in thus study are robust, four event windows are used 
throughout and compared. The introduction of three more windows would ensure that the 
analysis is done in short, medium and relatively long-term windows. This would 
simultaneously reduce the bias of short term studies and provide confirmation that the results 
obtained would still be obtained should the event windows be changed.  
The abnormal returns are also calculated just on the announcement day {0}, five days before 
to five days after the announcement date {-5,5}, and ten days before to five days after the event 
day {-10,5}. For all event windows, the estimation window remains the same, beginning 60 
days before the event and ending 30 days before the event {-60,-30}. The event date for each 
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acquisition is set to the date that that the deal is announced by either of the companies involved, 
as captured on SDC platinum.  
  
  Firm Size 
Gorton et al (2009) proposed that firms avoid takeover by increasing their size through 
acquisitions. Hence, the market value of each firm at the end of the year following the 
acquisition is used as a proxy for the size of the acquiring company. This way, the increase in 
the size of each firm by its last acquisition is captured in the size of the firm.  Past studies 
(Palepu, 1986; Gorton et al, 2009; and Choi et al, 2001) show that bidder quality has an inverse 
relationship with size. Hence, as the size decreases, bidder quality should increase ceteris 
paribus.  In most previous studies, the proxy for size is the natural logarithm of inflation-
adjusted sales or even the actual sales rather than the market capitalisation (Humphery-Jenner, 
2012).  
 
4. Development of model and hypotheses 
We used the Logit model to estimate the probability that a bad bidder could become a target. 
The dependent variable is set to 1 if the firm subsequently becomes a target and 0 if otherwise. 
While the key explanatory variable is the cumulative abnormal returns, there is much interest 
in observing the effects that size, profitability and leverage of the serial acquirers have on the 
probability of being a subsequent target.   
If the market for corporate control functions as expected in disciplining bad bidders, firms with 
negative total abnormal returns will more likely be targeted while firm with positive cumulative 
abnormal returns would less likely be targeted. It is thus expected that if the coefficient of CAR 
is negative and significant, the effectiveness of the disciplinary mechanism of the market would 
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be substantiated. But if the coefficient turns out positive and significant, then it would show 
that the market targets good serial acquirers rather than the bad ones.  
Insignificant results would suggest that the market does not consider the total abnormal returns 
by firms who are serial acquirers when they are targeted, but may use other yardsticks of 
measurement to decide which group they would like to acquire. If size, a control variable, has 
a negative and significant coefficient, it would suggest that smaller firms are more likely to 
become targets and the larger firms are less likely to be targeted. This also applies to the other 
control variable, debt-to-asset ratio, return on equity and the average target size.  
To further investigate the effect of value reducing acquisitions on the probability of a bad serial 
acquirer becoming either a hostile or a friendly takeover target, the following assumptions are 
made:  
 The logistic transformation of the probability that a firm is a hostile or friendly target 
for the sample of targets and non-targets; where the dependent variable is set to 1 if the 
firm becomes a target and 0 if otherwise. 
  the logistic transformation of the probability that a firm is a hostile target, for the 
sample of hostile targets and non-targets; where the dependent variable is set to 1 if the 
firm becomes a hostile target and 0 if otherwise; 
 the logistic transformation of the probability that a firm is a friendly target, for the 
sample of friendly targets and non-targets; where the dependent variable is set to 1 if 
the firm becomes the subject of a friendly acquisition and 0 if otherwise 
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The logit model in its simple form is expressed as: 
𝑙𝑛 (
𝜋
1−𝜋
) =  log(𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥  .................................................................1 
Hence: π = probability (Y = outcome of interest /X =x) = (
𝑒𝑎+ 𝛽𝑥
1+𝑒𝛼+𝛽𝑥
) .........................2 
Therefore, we constructed the logit regression based on four event windows and with six 
independent variables as follows: 
𝑙𝑛 (
𝜋
1−𝜋
) =  𝛽0 + log 𝑀𝑉 + 𝛽2. 𝐵𝐵𝐷 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑇𝑆 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐸 + 𝛽5𝐷𝐴𝑅 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝑅 ∗ + 𝜀........3 
Where:  
 log MV= Log of Market Value of the serial Acquirer 
 BBD= Bad bidder dummy= 1 if the Cumulative Abnormal Returns is negative and 0 if 
otherwise 
 ATS= Average Target size= Average target size of that each serial acquirer has bought 
over the sample period 
 ROE = Return on Equity 
 DAR= Debt to asset ratio 
 CAR**=  Cumulative abnormal returns (** denotes the respective event window) 
 𝜀 = Error term 
 
 Hypothesis One  
 
Although the fate of companies that destroy value through bad acquisitions have been tested in 
the past, most of the current literature has focused on the market effects of announcement on 
stock, caused by investor reactions to merger announcements rather than the motive for 
takeover. Most of these studies have concentrated in the US. Therefore, our hypotheses 
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examine if these mergers occur to correct past value destroying mergers. Our first null 
hypothesis states thus:  
H0: Serial Acquirers that make value destroying acquisitions are less likely to become takeover 
targets  
Rejection of the null hypothesis would indicate that investors use takeovers as a tool for 
corporate punishment and as a preferred form of punishment just as they use other disciplinary 
tools to discipline value-destroying managers.  
Hypothesis Two  
H0: the mechanism for corporate control (takeovers) functions efficiently in all three defined 
geographical regions (i.e. US, Europe and the rest of the world) 
The rejection of the null hypothesis would be an indication that bad serial acquirers are treated 
in different ways in the three geographical locations, and would suggest further investigation 
into the causes of these differences. 
5. Results 
 Univariate Analysis 
 
We examined the relationship between acquisitions and bidder quality, determining if bad 
bidders are more likely to be acquired than good bidders.  Table 4(a) shows the mean and media 
of the CARs, and the percentage of good and bad bidders in the different geographical regions 
as well as the whole sample.  While the bad bidders are typically in the range between 37% - 
40%, the good bidders constitute a minimum of 59% of the sample over all the permutations 
across the geographical regions and event windows. 
Table 4 (a): Univariate statistics of the percent returns to bidders 
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The table shows the results of the Univariate statistics of the returns to the bidders in the 
sample; indicating the proportion of bad and good bidders. The table is split into four panels 
consisting of the each geographical region.  
UNIVARIATE STATISTICS: PERCENT RETURNS TO BIDDERS      
PANEL A: ALL 
FIRMS 
[-2,2] [0] [-5,5] [-10,5] 
Mean CAR 6% 2% 2% 4% 
Median 4% 1% 1% 2% 
Standard Deviation 27% 11% 81% 78% 
Observations 2,933 2,933 2,933 2,933 
Bad Bidders 1,084 1,098 1,198 1,173 
Good Bidders 1,849 1,835 1,735 1,760 
Percentage Bad 
Bidders 
37% 37% 41% 40% 
Percentage Good 
Bidders 
63% 63% 59% 60%      
     
PANEL B: USA [-2,2] [0] [-5,5] [-10,5] 
Mean CAR 4% 2% 3% 3% 
Median 3% 1% 1% 0% 
Standard Deviation 24% 12% 26% 32% 
Observations 1,274 1,274 1,274 1,274 
Bad Bidders 517 535 517 545 
Good Bidders 757 739 757 729 
Percentage Bad 
Bidders 
41% 42% 41% 43% 
Percentage Good 
Bidders 
59% 58% 59% 57%      
     
PANEL C: 
EUROPE 
[-2,2] [0] [-5,5] [-10,5] 
Mean CAR 7% 3% -6% 3% 
Median 5% 1% 0% 0% 
Standard Deviation 18% 9% 130% 23% 
Observations 838 838 838 838 
Bad Bidders 266 233 361 302 
Good Bidders 572 605 477 536 
Percentage Bad 
Bidders 
32% 28% 43% 36% 
Percentage Good 
Bidders 
68% 72% 57% 64%      
     
PANEL D: ROW [-2,2] [0] [-5,5] [-10,5] 
Mean CAR 8% 3% 8% 6% 
Median 4% 1% 5% 5% 
Standard Deviation 36% 13% 71% 139% 
Observations 821 821 821 821 
Bad Bidders 301 330 320 326 
Good Bidders 520 491 501 495 
Percentage Bad 
Bidders 
37% 40% 39% 40% 
Percentage Good 
Bidders 
63% 60% 61% 60% 
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Table 4(b) shows the result of the frequency with which a bidder is targeted for acquisition. 
For the entire sample, 8.58% of the bad bidders are targeted as against 7.19% of the good 
bidders, implying that 1.39% more bad bidders (over good bidders) are targeted. Using the 
other three windows, the difference is 2.24% {0}, 010%{-5, 5} and 0.80%{-10, 5}. On the 
whole, the results suggest that both bad serial acquirers and good serial acquirers are treated 
almost in the same way. The bad acquirers do not seem more likely to be acquired than their 
good counterparts.  
The composition of the shareholding of these firms also prevents easy takeovers by targets. 
Large blocks of shares are usually owned by wealthy individuals and/or families who would 
not give up control simply because the firm is said to be making a value reducing acquisition. 
They would rather opt to replace a manager they are not pleased with than give up control of 
their firm.  
Finally, when acquisition is the main nucleus of a firm’s growth plan and strategy, negative 
returns around the event would not predispose the shareholders to punish managers especially 
when they know that the managers of the firm would make adequate returns in the long run 
which would adequately compensate for the immediate loss that they have experienced. 
Table 4 (b) : Univariate results of the frequency with which a bidder is targeted for 
an acquisition   
PANEL A:     
 
ALL FIRMS 
(-2,2) 
8% 
(0) 
8% 
(-5,5) 
8% 
(-10,5) 
8% 
 
 
PANEL B:            
BAD BIDDERS 8.58% 9.11% 7.76% 8.18% 
GOOD BIDDERS 7.19% 6.87% 7.67% 7.39% 
DIFFERENCE 1.39% 2.24% 0.10% 0.80% 
 
 
This summary of the results from the tables above indicates that the market for corporate 
control rarely uses takeover as a disciplinary tool on serial acquirers, whether good or bad, and 
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would rather use other disciplinary measures to enact control on the managers. The alternate 
explanation would be that the market expects that subsequent acquisitions by the company 
would cancel out the negative returns that they have and thus would see no need to discipline 
the managers now.  
 
6. Regression results 
 
 Results for Hypothesis One 
The results for hypothesis one are presented in Tables 5-7. The CARs, which is the main 
variable of interest shows a consistent result across three event windows {-2, 2}, {0} and      {-
10,5}, where it is both negative and significant at the 10% level, with coefficients of -0.45, -
1.03 and -0.20 respectively. Although this is in direct contrast to what the Univariate analysis 
showed, it conforms to what was expected as the norm. It shows that serial acquirers who have 
a negative total abnormal return are more likely to be targeted than serial acquirers who have 
positive cumulative abnormal returns.  
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Table 5: Logistic regression results for the probability that a firm becomes a subsequent 
target 
The table shows the logistic regression results over several events windows where the 
dependent variable has been set to 1 if the firm subsequently became a target and 0 otherwise. 
CAR is the sum of the individual AR from the acquisitions that a firm makes over 10 years 
observation period.  
All Firms - Dependent Variable =1 if Serial Acquirer became a target, 0 otherwise 
 EVENT WINDOW 
 {-2, 2} {0} {-5, 5} {-10, 5} 
     
Log_MV -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) 
BBD 0.07 0.13 0.21 0.15 
 (0.675) (0.391) (0.135) (0.312) 
ATS -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
ROE -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.355) (0.420) (0.429) (0.645) 
DAR -0.42* -0.41* -0.43* -0.42* 
 (0.056) (0.060) (0.053) (0.057) 
CAR -0.45* -1.03* 0.01 -0.20* 
 (0.098) (0.078) (0.821) (0.069) 
Constant -1.96*** -1.97*** -2.05*** -2.02*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Observations 2,879 2,879 2,879 2,879 
Model Chi-Square 25.15 25.19 22.36 27.97 
        Notes: p values are in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1% 
The fourth event window had a positive coefficient of 0.01 but was not significant. It can thus 
be inferred that in general, the mechanism for corporate control does function as it is expected: 
to discipline managers of firms that are serial acquirers which make value reducing 
acquisitions.  
The first explanatory variable, Log_MV, shows a negative coefficient of -0.06 in all four event 
windows and all are significant at a 1% level. This suggests that size plays an important role in 
determining the probability that a firm becomes a target. The implication is that larger firms 
that make value destroying acquisitions are less likely to be targeted than smaller firms in 
similar position. 
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The average size of the targets (ATS) is also consistently significant at 5% level across the four 
estimation windows.  This showed that firms that carried out larger deal sizes are less likely to 
be taken over than firms that carried out smaller deal sizes. These results imply that large 
companies which are expected to execute large deals are less likely to become target than 
smaller companies that execute smaller deals. This is in conformity with the findings of Choi 
et al, (2001). 
Finally, the two variables which represent the financial performance of the firm, both show 
varied results. The effect of ROE is insignificant across the four event windows, suggesting 
that the financial profitability of a serial acquirer does not affect the probability that it would 
be a target. This would imply that the shareholders were mainly concerned about the value that 
is created or destroyed during acquisitions as the major source of gains in the company.  
On the other hand, the level of gearing (DAR) is between -0.41 to -0.43 across the four windows 
and significant at 10% in all four, suggesting that serial acquirers with a high leverage ratio are 
less likely to become targets than serial acquirers with a more proportionate level of gearing. 
This shows that bidders are not too keen on taking on a company with such a high level of risk 
even though it had the ability to provide a higher tax shield for its new owner. It would also 
suggest that prospective bidders would require very high returns from such a company (in line 
with a typical market model portfolio) which they might not be able to offer, given the constant 
acquisition habit.  
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Table 6: Logistic regression results for the probability that a firm becomes a 
hostile target 
The table shows the logistic regression results over several events windows where the 
dependent variable has been set to 1 if the firm subsequently became a target and 0 otherwise. 
CAR is the sum of the individual AR from the acquisitions that a firm makes over 10 years 
observation period.  
All Firms - Dependent Variable =1 if Serial Acquirer became a hostile target, 0 if a non-target 
 EVENT WINDOW 
 {-2, 2} {0} {-5, 5} {-10, 5} 
     
Log_MV 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 
 (0.578) (0.646) (0.579) (0.627) 
BBD 0.03 -0.22 -0.04 -0.10 
 (0.973) (0.802) (0.966) (0.909) 
ATS -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.242) (0.241) (0.242) (0.243) 
ROE -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.160) (0.129) (0.137) (0.115) 
DAR 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.705) (0.571) (0.642) (0.713) 
CAR 0.39* -1.50 0.14** -0.01 
 (0.067) (0.146) (0.013) (0.948) 
Constant -6.23*** -6.02*** -6.18*** -6.10*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Observations 2,694 2,694 2,694 2,694 
Model Chi-Square 12.26 11.87 22.86 11.29 
Notes: p values are in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 
1% 
 
In summary, the results for the estimation of the logit model, presented in Table 5, remain 
robust after controlling for firm size, leverage, profitability and target size. The results confirm 
that firms that make good acquisitions are less likely to be targeted than firms that make bad 
acquisitions. 
The results in Table 6 seek to explain the factors that predict the probability that a firm would 
be a hostile target. Here, apart from the CAR, none of the explanatory variables are statistically 
significant to predict the probability that a serial acquirer would become a hostile target. When 
estimated using the 5 day event window, CAR has coefficients of 0.39 and 0.14 which are 
statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels respectively. 
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These results suggest that firms with positive total abnormal returns are more likely to become 
hostile targets than firms with negative total returns. This would suggest that firms are acquired 
by others when they feel threatened by their acquisitive habit and are taken over to prevent 
them from going after some other firms. 
Finally, the third sets of results, shown in Table 7, determine the effect of the factors that 
determine if a firm would become a friendly target. Again, Log_MV shows the same co-
efficient of -0.04 across all the windows, which are all significant at the 10% level, indicating 
that larger firms are less likely to become friendly targets while smaller firms are more likely 
to be friendly targets. The effect of ATS is also significant across the four windows at 5% level, 
indicating that the average size that the serial acquirer had bought in the past could affect the 
likelihood that it would become a friendly target.   
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Table 7: Logistic regression results for the probability that a firm becomes a friendly 
target 
 
The table shows the logistic regression results over several events windows where the 
dependent variable has been set to 1 if the firm subsequently became a target and 0 otherwise. 
CAR is the sum of the individual AR from the acquisitions that a firm makes over 10 years 
observation period.  
All Firms - Dependent Variable =1 if Serial Acquirer became a friendly target, 0 if a non-
target 
 EVENT WINDOW 
 {-2, 2} {0} {-5, 5} {-10, 5} 
     
Log_MV -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* 
 (0.059) (0.056) (0.064) (0.071) 
BBD 0.09 0.17 0.24 0.17 
 (0.633) (0.257) (0.115) (0.256) 
ATS -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) 
ROE -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.314) (0.378) (0.388) (0.599) 
DAR -0.38 -0.37 -0.38* -0.37 
 (0.103) (0.106) (0.098) (0.105) 
CAR -0.50 -0.78 -0.01 -0.19 
 (0.197) (0.209) (0.0884) (0.046) 
Constant -
2.17*** 
-
2.21*** 
-
2.26*** 
-2.24*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Observations 2,874 2,874 2,874 2,874 
Model Chi-Square 18.81 18.07 16.98 22.25 
Notes: p values are in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 
1% 
 
Interestingly, the leverage (DAR) is only significant when the 11day window is used implying 
that high leverage makes it less likely to become a friendly target. This is however not 
significant at the other event windows.  
The results indicate that serial acquirers that make value reducing acquisitions are more likely 
to become targets than those that make value creating acquisitions. The results further show 
that larger firms are less likely to become targets, but when they do, they are more likely to 
become hostile targets rather than friendly targets.  
There is thus strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis that serial acquirers which make 
value destroying acquisitions are more likely to become takeover targets. 
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Results for Hypothesis Two 
 
The results for hypothesis two are presented in Tables 8-10.  These determine whether the 
mechanism for corporate control is similar in all the geographical regions of the world; 
classified as United States (US), Europe (EUR) and the Rest of the World (ROW). Four event 
windows are used to ensure that the results obtained remain robust and the same variables used 
on the whole sample. 
Table 8 shows the result for the probability that a bad bidder in the US will become a target.  
The result shows that the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the major determinant of 
whether a serial acquirer subsequently becomes a target in the United States. The negative 
coefficient of -0.41, -0.97, -0.51 and -0.46, all significant at 10% level, across the four event 
windows respectively, indicate that firms that have a negative total abnormal returns are more 
likely to become targets than firms that have a positive total abnormal return.  
The significance of CAR also indicates that firms that purchase smaller firms are more likely 
to become targets themselves as opposed to firms that make bigger acquisitions who are less 
likely to become targets. This is indicated by the -0.00 coefficient across the four event 
windows, all significant at 5% level. In contrast, the effect of Log_MV is insignificant, which 
suggests that both large and small firms are equally likely to become targets subject to their 
acquisition performance and the size of the targets they had previously purchased.  
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Table 8:   Logistic regression results for the probability that a bad bidder becomes in the 
US becomes a target 
 
The table shows the logistic regression results over several events windows where the 
dependent variable has been set to 1 if the firm subsequently became a target and 0 otherwise. 
CAR is the sum of the individual AR from the acquisitions that a firm makes over 10 years 
observation period.  Firms are indigenous to the United States. 
Dependent Variable =1 if Serial Acquirer became a target, 0 otherwise 
 EVENT WINDOW 
  {-2, 2} {0} {-5, 5} {-10, 5} 
     
Log_MV -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.478) (0.480) (0.497) (0.489) 
BBD 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.11 
 (0.680) (0.426) (0.561) (0.547) 
ATS -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.036) (0.032) (0.036) (0.038) 
ROE -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.909) (0.996) (0.997) (0.988) 
DAR -0.30 -0.29 -0.31 -0.32 
 (0.156) (0.170) (0.142) (0.131) 
CAR -0.41* -0.97* -0.51* -0.46 
 (0.070) (0.088) (0.057) (0.130) 
Constant -1.54*** -1.56*** -1.56*** -1.56*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Observations 1,267 1,267 1,267 1,267 
Model Chi-Square 12.02 12.31 13.78 13.73 
     
    Notes: p values are in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant 
at 1% 
 
The evidence for the United States seems characteristic of a mature economy where the stock 
market is deep and investors usually have no personal interests in the companies that they invest 
in except for the expectation of returns from their investments. 
Table 9 shows the results of the European sample. Similar to the US, CAR is the major factor 
that influences the probability that a firm would subsequently become a target. Of the four 
coefficients obtained for CAR from the four event windows, two are positive but insignificant 
(0.17 and 0.03) for the 5-day and 11-day event windows respectively while the other two are 
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negative and significant at the 10% level, (-2.69 and -1.17) for the event day and the 16-day 
window.  
Table 9:   Logistic regression results for the probability that a bad bidder becomes 
 in the Europe becomes a target 
The table shows the logistic regression results over several events windows where the 
dependent variable has been set to 1 if the firm subsequently became a target and 0 otherwise. 
CAR is the sum of the individual AR from the acquisitions that a firm makes over 10 years 
observation period.  Firms are indigenous to the Europe. 
Dependent Variable =1 if Serial Acquirer became a target, 0 otherwise 
 EVENT WINDOW 
  {-2, 2} {0} {-5, 5} {-10, 5} 
     
Log_MV -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.851) (0.782) (0.844) (0.855) 
BBD 0.12 -0.08 0.09 -0.13 
 (0.841) (0.879) (0.867) (0.823) 
ATS -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.360) (0.360) (0.359) (0.357) 
ROE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.331) (0.350) (0.341) (0.428) 
DAR -1.08 -1.11 -1.06 -1.03 
 (0.138) (0.129) (0.141) (0.147) 
CAR 0.17 -2.69* 0.03 -1.17* 
 (0.878) (0.077) (0.605) (0.076) 
Constant -3.61*** -3.43*** -3.59*** -3.51*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Observations 825 825 825 825 
Model Chi-Square 4.56 5.44 4.45 5.83 
     
Notes: p values are in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 
1% 
 
The results for Europe indicates that firms that make negative cumulative abnormal returns are 
more likely to expose themselves as the subjects of acquisition than those that have positive 
abnormal returns.  
Finally, Table 10 is the result from the last geographical group, ROW (Rest of the World). In 
sharp contrast to the other two groups, the most influential variable is Log_MV, which has a 
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significant coefficient of  -0.22 across the four event windows.  This indicates that the larger 
the firm, the less likely it would subsequently become a target.  
 
Table 10:  Logistic regression results for the probability that a bad bidder becomes in the 
Rest of the World becomes a target 
 
 The table shows the logistic regression results over several events windows where the 
dependent variable has been set to 1 if the firm subsequently became a target and 0 otherwise. 
CAR is the sum of the individual AR from the acquisitions that a firm makes over 10 years 
observation period.  Firms are indigenous to all countries except those in Europe and United 
States. 
Dependent Variable =1 if Serial Acquirer became a target, 0 otherwise 
 EVENT WINDOW 
  {-2, 2} {0} {-5, 5} {-10, 5} 
     
Log_MV -0.22*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BBD -0.50 -0.43 -0.35 -0.48 
 (0.203) (0.291) (0.326) (0.198) 
ATS -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.531) (0.522) (0.529) (0.524) 
ROE -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** 
 (0.367) (0.378) (0.358) (0.003) 
DAR 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.56 
 (0.292) (0.272) (0.290) (0.249) 
CAR -0.41 -0.69 -0.00 -0.17*** 
 (0.472) (0.517) (0.966) (0.001) 
Constant -1.29*** -1.34*** -1.41*** -1.36*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Observations 790 790 790 790 
Model Chi-Square 19.98 20.18 20.15 54.52 
Notes: p values are in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 
1% 
 
Only one of the CAR coefficients is significant which suggests that the total abnormal return 
is not a major consideration in the likelihood of a firm becoming a target for the rest of the 
world. This is in line with the Univariate analysis and with the current cultures where wealthy 
individuals and families own large conglomerates and do not give up control because the firm 
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made poor acquisitions. Instead, they would rather sack the managers responsible since they 
can easily do this as they have majority control of the firms. 
Based on the results obtained, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that serial acquirers 
are treated in the same way in all three regions.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The study tests the hypothesis that bad serial acquirers are more likely to become target 
themselves compared to good serial acquirers. We find that the probability that a bad bidder 
would become a target is higher than that of a good bidder. This is consistent with previous 
studies (Mitchell and Lehn, 1990; and Choi et al, 2001) on takeovers as a measure of discipline 
and corporate governance mechanism which established that bad bidders are more likely to be 
subsequent targets.  We extend this hypothesis to firms operating in other continents and 
establish a similar pattern of disciplinary measures against managements that are bad serial 
bidders.  
Our result on the Rest of the World (ROW), which comprising mostly the developing countries 
in Africa and Asia, establish that bad bidders are less likely to be acquired than other serial 
acquirers who have been considered to have better returns over their acquisitions. This implies 
that there is limitation in the application of the positivist agency theory across countries and 
catalysed by the cultural difference and huge economic disparity among developing and 
developed countries.  
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